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1 Introduction.
The adoption of an environmental policy usually imposes costs on society, but is expected
to yield a social return in the form of a stream of benefits, e.g., health benefits from less
pollution. Those benefits, however, usually occur in the future and may be highly uncertain,
so that (as with other private or public investments) the actual return is uncertain. This
is especially true for environmental policies involving stock externalities, such as increases
in greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations, the acidification of lakes and oceans, and the
accumulation of toxic waste. All of these problems involve long time horizons and uncertain
impacts. This paper examines the risk/return tradeoff for environmental investments and the
implications of that tradeoff for policy choice. I utilize a very simple and stylizedmodel which
focuses on climate change, because of the long time horizon and considerable uncertainty
involved. However, the framework developed here could could easily be applied to other
environmental (and non-environmental) policy problems, such as the management of toxic
(including nuclear) waste, and the development and protection of water resources.1
Consider a policy designed to reduce the accumulation of atmospheric greenhouse gases,
e.g., via the imposition of a carbon tax. That policy would have some cost to society, but by
reducing GHG emissions it would reduce the extent of warming by some uncertain amount,
and thus would yield uncertain future benefits. The uncertainty arises because we have
limited knowledge of the relationship between GHG concentrations and temperature, and
we know very little about how higher temperatures would affect GDP growth or other indicia
of welfare. Thus we could ask two questions. First, how large are the expected social benefits
from a given policy relative to the risk involved? Second, to what extent is the social value
of the policy (measured by society’s willingness to pay for it) driven by expected benefits
from the policy versus uncertainty over those benefits.
The answers to these questions can guide policy design. Alternative policies might have
different impacts on the expected change in temperature over the next century versus the
1For a general discussion of the nature of the uncertainties involved in environmental policies, whether
or not stock externalities are involved, see Pindyck (2007).
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variance of that change. For example, rather than (or in addition to) GHG emissions abate-
ment, money might be spent to improve our knowledge of how GHG emissions affect temper-
ature, and how changes in temperature affect economic output. Therefore a purely research-
focused policy might do little or nothing to reduce the expected change in temperature (and
hence the expected impact on GDP), but might reduce the variance of our estimates of
future temperature and GDP. Likewise, investments in adaptation to climate change (e.g.,
the development of hardier hybrid crops) would reduce the right tail of the distribution of
future damages, reducing both the variance and expectation of damages.
As a general matter, there is value in reducing the expected damages from GHG emissions
and in reducing the variance of those damages. At issue is the tradeoff between the two. To
what extent should policy be aimed at reducing expected damages versus the variance of
those damages?
The framework I use to address this question is “willingness to pay” (WTP). Consider
a policy that would reduce expected future temperature increases, and possibly reduce the
uncertainty over those temperature increases. The willingness to pay for the policy is the
maximum percentage reduction in current and future consumption that society should be
willing to give up in order to achieve those reductions in the expectation and/or variance of
future temperature increases.2 This does not mean it will be possible to achieve these reduc-
tions given the revenues from this WTP; doing so may be more costly, or less costly. WTP
relates only to the demand side of policy, i.e., society’s reservation price for the achievement
of particular policy objectives.
In Pindyck (2011a, 2012), I calculatedWTP for GHG abatement policies that would limit
future increases in temperature to some specified amount (e.g., 3◦C), based on a probability
distribution for the rate of warming absent the policy, i.e., under “business as usual” (BAU).
Of course WTP depends on the probability distribution, and in particular depends on both
the expected increase in temperature under BAU and the variance of the increase in tem-
perature. I calculated the trade-off between the expected value of a temperature increase
2I used a related measure of WTP to examine climate change policies under uncertainty; see Pindyck
(2011a, 2012). WTP has also been used in the context of climate change by Heal and Kristro¨m (2002).
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versus its standard deviation under BAU as determinants of WTP. That trade-off is the
marginal rate of substitution along an “iso-WTP curve,” i.e., the locus of combinations of
the expected value versus the standard deviation of the change in temperature under BAU
such that the WTP (e.g., to prevent any temperature increase) is constant. The results
showed that uncertainty over temperature change can be a stronger driver of WTP than
expectations, and thus should be a major focus of climate change policy.
That earlier work focused on the starting conditions for policy, i.e., the relative contribu-
tions to WTP of the expected value versus the variance of the change in temperature under
BAU. Here I turn to the objectives of policy, and examine the trade-off between reducing
the expected rate of the increase in temperature versus reducing the variance of future in-
creases in temperature. In particular, what combinations of drift reduction and variance
reduction yield the same WTP? Those combinations trace out a social indifference curve —
combinations of changes in drift and variance that are welfare-equivalent.
Given estimates of the costs of drift reduction and variance reduction, we can take this a
step further and determine whether the cost of a particular combination of drift and variance
reduction is less or greater than the WTP for that combination. If the cost is less than the
WTP, the policy yields a positive social surplus. If the cost exceeds the NPV, the policy is
not economically feasible. Finally, assuming the costs are convex (as we would expect), we
can determine the optimal risk-return tradeoff for policy design.
In the next section I lay out the model that I use to address these questions. Despite
its simplicity, the model captures the key features of environmental policy risk and expected
returns that are of interest. In Section 3, I use the model to analyze risk and return for a
policy that reduces the expected rate of temperature increase by some incremental amount.
Section 4 addresses policies to change the expected rate of temperature increases and/or the
variance of future temperature increases, and shows how we can calculate the willingness to
pay for such polices. In Section 5, I calibrate this model to information on global warming
and its impact, and then use it to address risk-return tradeoffs.
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2 A Simple Model.
I use a simple model in which an environmental stock variable, in this case temperature
change, follows an arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) with positive drift and some volatil-
ity.3 The impact on consumption is through the real growth rate of GDP, which is linearly
related to the change in temperature. Welfare is measured using CRRA utility. Various ex-
pectations and variances of utility can be found analytically, making the model very tractable.
2.1 Temperature and GDP Growth.
Let Xt denote the anthropomorphic increase in temperature from its current level. I assume
that under “business as usual,” Xt follows an arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) with drift
and volatility αX and σX respectively. I also assume that the impact of an increase in Xt is
to reduce the real rate of growth of consumption, gt. This differs from the damage function
specifications used in most integrated assessment models of climate change, where Xt is
assumed to reduce consumption directly.4 Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
support the view that higher temperatures (and environmental damage in general) should
affect the growth rate of consumption rather than its level, as in the model I use here.5
3In the context of global warming, the actual stock variable is the atmospheric GHG concentration,
which in turn drives temperature change, but with a lag. I ignore the lag, and thus can treat temperature
change itself as the stock variable. In the context of toxic waste, the stock variable could be the quantity or
concentration of waste material over some geographic area.
4Most economic studies of climate change relate the temperature increase T to GDP through a “loss
function” L(T ), with L(0) = 1 and L′ < 0, so GDP at a horizon H is L(TH)GDPH , where GDPH is but-for
GDP with no warming. These studies — see, e.g., Nordhaus (2008) — typically use an inverse-quadratic or
exponential-quadratic function. The loss function L(T ) implies that if temperatures rise but later fall, GDP
could return to its but-for path with no permanent loss.
5There are several reasons to expect higher temperatures to affect the growth rate of GDP as opposed
to the level. First, some effects of warming will be permanent; e.g., destruction of ecosystems, extinction
of species, and deaths from weather extremes. A growth rate effect allows warming to have a permanent
impact. Second, there is theoretical support for a growth rate effect. The resources needed to counter the
impact of warming will reduce those available for R&D and capital investment, reducing growth. Adaptation
to rising temperatures is equivalent to the cost of increasingly strict emission standards, which, as Stokey
(1998) has shown with an endogenous growth model, reduces the rate of return on capital and lowers the
growth rate. (Also see the related study by Brock and Taylor (2010).) Finally, there is empirical support
for a growth rate effect. Using historical data on temperatures and precipitation over 50 years for a panel of
136 countries, Dell, Jones, and Olken (2009, 2012) have shown that higher temperatures reduce GDP growth
rates but not levels. Also, using economic and financial market data for a panel of 147 countries over the
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The process for Xt is thus:
dXt = αXdt+ σXdz , (1)
where dz is the increment of a Weiner process, and X0 = 0. Note that eqn. (1) is essentially
a vehicle for describing the expectation and variance of the temperature change from t = 0
to any future point in time T . In particular, E0(XT ) = αXT and Var(XT ) = σ2XT .
The growth rate of consumption is given by the following linear relationship:
gt = g0 − γXt , (2)
where g0 is the growth rate absent any change in Xt. Thus gt also follows an ABM:
dg = −γαXdt− γσXdz ≡ −αdt − σdz . (3)
Eqn. (2) implies that at any time s,
g(s) = g0 − αs− σ
∫ s
0
dz = g0 − αs− σz(s) ,
so consumption at a future time t can be written as:
Ct = C0e
∫ t
0
g(s)ds = C0e
g0t−
1
2
αt2−σ
∫ t
0
z(s)ds , (4)
To measure welfare, I use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) social utility function:
U(Ct) = C
1−η
t /(1− η) , (5)
where η is the index of relative risk aversion (and 1/η is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution). At time 0, welfare (under business as usual) is then given by:
W0 =
1
1− ηE0
∫
∞
0
C1−ηt e
−δ(t−s)dt (6)
where δ is the rate of time preference, i.e., the rate at which utility is discounted.
period 1950 to 2007, Bansal and Ochoa (2011a, b) show that increases in temperature have a strong negative
impact on economic growth. For an analysis of the policy implications of direct versus growth rate impact,
see Pindyck (2011a).
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2.2 Willingness to Pay.
Suppose that with some expenditure over time, society could reduce αX and/or σX, i.e.,
reduce the expected rate of temperature change and/or the volatility of temperature change
(and hence the variance of the change in temperature at any arbitrary date in the future). Let
αX and σX be the drift and volatility of Xt under BAU, and α
′
X and σ
′
X be the corresponding
drift and volatility under a policy that has a permanent cost to society of w percent of
consumption. Here α′X ≤ αX and σ′X ≤ σX . Willingness to pay is the maximum value of w
that society would accept to reduce αX to α
′
X and reduce σX to σ
′
X .
While a policy that reduces αX might seems straightforward, how as a practical matter
could a policy be designed to reduce σX, i.e., to reduce the variance of temperature change
T years from now? Investment in research is the most obvious example. As I discuss later
in this paper, in the context of climate change research can be expected to provide better
estimates of the rate of temperature increase under, say, BAU, and also better estimates of
the impact of higher temperatures. Another example is investments in adaptation to higher
temperatures. An extreme case of this is the development of geoengineering technologies
that could be used to limit or even reverse temperature increases.6
Note that WTP is society’s reservation price for achieving the policy objective (αX, σX)→
(α′X , σ
′
X). However, it is a reservation price for a particular type of policy and a particular
form of pricing: At time t = 0 the policy is adopted (with no option to wait for more in-
formation), and the drift and volatility of Xt are immediately changed to their new values.
The payment flow, however, starts at t = 0 and continues forever, i.e., takes the form of a
permanent reduction of consumption of w percent (yielding a permanent flow of revenue to
pay for the policy objective). One might naturally argue that this is unrealistic. First, we
would expect that changing αX and/or σX should take time, and perhaps considerable time.
Second, there is little reason to expect that the flow cost of achieving this policy objective
will be a fixed percentage of GNP or consumption. Thus WTP might instead be defined as
6This might be done by seeding the atmosphere with sulfur particles. For a discussion of this and other
geoengineering approaches to climate change, see Barrett (2007).
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the willingness to give up a particular time-varying percentage of consumption in return for
a shift in αX and/or σX that occurs over some period of time. However, the simplification
that I use (αX and/or σX change instantly and the flow cost is a constant percentage of
consumption) adds clarity to the basic results.
Welfare under the policy is given by:
W1(α
′
X , σ
′
X) =
(1− w)1−η
1− η E
′
0
∫
∞
0
C1−ηt e
−δtdt , (7)
where E ′0 denotes the expectation at t = 0 when the drift and volatility of Xt are α′X and
σ′X. Under BAU (i.e., no policy), welfare is:
W2 =
1
1− ηE0
∫
∞
0
C1−ηt e
−δtdt , (8)
where E0 is the expectation under the original drift and volatility, αX and σX . Then WTP
is the value w∗ that equates W1 and W2. I treat GDP and consumption as interchangeable,
and assume that all losses from higher temperatures, including health effects and ecosystem
damage, can be monetized and included in GDP.
From eqns. (2) and (3), the drift and volatility of temperature correspond to a drift and
volatility of the real growth rate gt, i.e., α = γαX , σ = γσX, α
′ = γα′X , and σ
′ = γσ′X. In
what follows I will refer to changes in α and σ rather than αX and σX.
Suppose that under BAU, the drift and volatility of gt are α0 and σ0 respectively. If
we specify a target drift and volatility, α′ and σ′, we can calculate the WTP for a policy
that would achieve this target. Suppose that WTP is w∗1. We are interested, however, in
the tradeoff between drift reduction and variance reduction as targets of policy. That is,
we want to know what combinations of drift reduction and variance reduction will yield
the same WTP, w∗1, assuming we start at α0 and σ0. We can compute the locus of such
combinations and thereby obtain an “iso-WTP curve,” i.e., combinations of α and σ which,
starting at α0 and σ0, all have the same WTP, and thus are welfare-equivalent.
An iso-WTP curve is illustrated in Figure 1. Point A is the starting drift and volatility,
and points B and C are two targets, both of which have the same WTP of w∗1 = .03. Moving
from A to any point on the curve will have the same WTP of .03. Note that α increases as
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we move down the vertical axis, so the curve represents a social indifference curve between
expected return (a lower value of α) and risk (a higher value of σ). It is thus analogous to the
return-risk indifference curve of an investor choosing a portfolio of equities and a risk-free
asset. The figure also shows another iso-WTP curve, labelled w∗2 = .05; moving from α0 and
σ0 to any point on this curve would have a WTP of .05.
If we knew the cost of reducing α and the cost of reducing σ, we could plot an iso-cost
line. If those costs were linear in the change in α and the change in σ, the iso-cost line would
be a straight line, as drawn in Figure 1. Its tangency with the iso-WTP curve w∗1 = .03
at point B is the cost-minimizing target combination of α and σ. There are other target
combinations of α and σ that have a WTP of .03, but they would be more costly to achieve.
In Figure 1, moving from point A to point B has the same WTP = .03 as moving from
point A to point C. We can also calculate the combination of starting values for α0 and
σ0 that yield the same WTP = .03 when moving to point B. Doing so is useful because
it allows us to determine combinations of temperature drift and volatility under BAU that
have the same welfare implications. In other words, how important is the expected change in
temperature (under BAU) relative to its variance as determinants of the demand for policy?
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows two iso-WTP curves. Curve 1 gives combi-
nations of starting values α0 and σ0 such that the movement to point B has a WTP = .03.
Thus w∗(A→ B) = w∗(D → B) = w∗(A→ C) = .03. But w∗(D → A) = w∗(B → C) = 0,
so w∗(D → C) = .03. Thus moving from any point on Curve 1 to any point on Curve 2 will
have the same WTP.
The iso-WTP and iso-cost curves in Figures 1 and 2 are just illustrative examples. Later
I will calibrate this simple model to a set of estimates of temperature change and confidence
intervals compiled by the IPCC (2007) and others, and then use the calibrated model to
obtain iso-WTP and iso-cost curves along the lines of those shown in Figures 1 and 2.
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3 Risk and Return for Policy Outcomes.
Consider a policy to reduce the expected growth rate of temperature and thereby increase
the expected growth rate of consumption. Putting aside the cost of the policy, we want to
compare the expected benefit to the uncertainty over that benefit, i.e., compare the expected
return to the riskiness of that return. This provides a way to compare policies. Two policies
might have the same expected benefit, but different degrees of risk.
I begin with a simple two-period example in which consumption today is known but
consumption at a future time T is uncertain. I examine the benefit that results from a
small increase in the drift of the growth rate (resulting from a small decrease in the drift
of temperature). I then turn to a continuous-time model, and again consider a policy that
results in a small increase in the drift of the growth rate. Of interest is the expectation and
variance of the cumulative return from the policy over the entire horizon.
3.1 Two Periods.
In this simple case, C0 = 1 and CT is uncertain, the outcome of the stochastic growth process,
as given by eqn. (4). Given α and σ, welfare is stochastic and is given by:
W˜T =
1
1− η
[
1 + (C1−ηT e
−δT )
]
(9)
Now consider a policy that results (at t = 0) in an incremental decrease in αX , the expected
change in temperature, and hence a decrease α = γαX , the expected change in the growth
rate of consumption. The (stochastic) return, measured in terms of increased welfare from
that policy is
r˜αT = −∂W˜T
∂α
= − 1
1− η
∂
∂α
C1−ηT e
−δT . (10)
Note that
C1−ηT = e
(1−η)
∫ T
0
g(s)ds ,
and from eqn. (3), the growth rate g(s) at time s > 0 is given by
g(s) = g0 − αs− σ
∫ s
0
dz = g0 − αs− σz(s) .
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Thus
C1−ηT = e
(1−η)g0T−
1
2
(1−η)αT 2−σ(1−η)
∫ T
0
z(s)ds , (11)
and
− ∂
∂α
C1−ηT =
1
2
(1− η)T 2C1−ηT . (12)
The (stochastic) return from this policy is thus
r˜αT =
1
2
T 2C1−ηT e
−δT . (13)
We want the expectation and variance of this return. The Appendix derives a formula
for the expectation of C1−ηT . Using that formula, the expected return is:
r¯αT =
1
2
T 2E0(C1−ηT )e−δT = 12T 2e−ρ0T−
1
2
α(1−η)T 2+ 1
6
σ2(1−η)2T 3 (14)
where
ρ0 ≡ δ + (η − 1)g0 .
Note that ∂r¯/∂α > 0 and ∂r¯/∂σ2 > 0. The first inequality simply results from the fact
that the higher is the starting value of α, the greater is the value of reducing α. The second
inequality follows from the fact that E0(C1−ηT ) is a convex function of the rate of increase in
temperature, so that on average stochastic fluctuations in temperature increase the value of
reducing its rate of growth. Finally, ∂r¯/∂η can be positive or negative, depending on the
relative size of the starting growth rate g0.
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To get the standard deviation of this return, note from eqn. (12) that
E0
(
∂
∂α
C1−ηT
)2
= 1
4
(1− η)2T 4E0(C2−2ηT ) . (15)
Now use results in the Appendix to get E0(C2−2ηT ), so that
E0
(
∂
∂α
C1−ηT
)2
= 1
4
(1− η)2T 4e−2ρ0T−α(1−η)T 2+ 23σ2(1−η)2T 3 .
7∂r¯/∂η = [ 1
2
αT 2− 1
3
σ2(1− η)T 3 − g0T ]r¯αT . The first two terms in the brackets are positive and the last
is negative. If g0T is large relative to the first two terms, ∂r¯/∂η will be negative. Higher g0T implies higher
CT and thus greater reduction in marginal utility at T from an increase in η, and hence a lower return from
reducing α. A higher value of αT implies the opposite — lower CT . A higher value of σ
2T 2 implies a higher
value of marginal utility at T (via Jensen’s inequality).
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Thus the variance of the return is given by
V(rαT ) = E0(r˜2αT )− r¯2αT
= 1
4
T 4E0(C2−2ηT )e−2δT − r¯2αT
= 1
4
T 4e−2ρ0T−α(1−η)T
2+ 2
3
σ2(1−η)2T 3 − 1
4
T 4e−2ρ0T−α(1−η)T
2+ 1
3
σ2(1−η)2T 3
= 1
4
T 4e−2ρ0T−α(1−η)T
2+ 1
3
σ2(1−η)2T 3[e
1
3
σ2(1−η)2T 3 − 1]
= 1
4
T 4[E0(C1−ηT )e−δT ]2[e
1
3
σ2(1−η)2T 3 − 1] (16)
The standard deviation of the return is therefore
SD(rαT ) =
1
2
T 2E0(C1−ηT )e−δT [e
1
3
σ2(1−η)2T 3 − 1]1/2 = r¯αT [e 13σ2(1−η)2T 3 − 1]1/2 . (17)
SD(rαT ) is proportional to r¯αT , so a convenient way to characterize the relative riskiness
of this return is by its Sharpe ratio, i.e., the ratio of the expected return to its standard
deviation. From eqns. (14) and (17), the Sharpe ratio is
SαT =
r¯αT
SD(rαT )
=
[
e
1
3
(1−η)2σ2T 3 − 1
]
−1/2
(18)
The Sharpe ratio is useful because it summarizes the effects of changes in various parameters,
such as volatility, σ. As can be seen from eqns. (14) and (17), and increase in σ causes an
increase in both the expected return and the standard deviation of the return. But the effect
on the standard deviation is larger, so that an increase in σ causes a decrease in SαT .
Note that the Sharpe ratio is independent of the drift, α. The reason is that the expo-
nential growth rates for both the expected return and the standard deviation include the
factor 1
2
α(1 − η)T 2, which cancels out of the ratio. Also note that if η 6= 1, SαT → 0 as
T → ∞. The reason is that the standard deviation of the return grows faster with T than
the expected return. Finally, an increase in the index of relative risk aversion, η, leads to a
decrease in the Sharpe ratio. The reason is that the return itself is risk-adjusted, i.e., it is
proportional not to the change in future consumption but to the change in the utility from
future consumption. Thus an increase in η has the same effect as an increase in σ.
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3.2 Continuous-Time, Finite Horizon.
Now suppose we have a horizon T so that welfare is given by the integral of discounted utility
over t = 0 to T . Taking future consumption as unknown, welfare is:
W˜ =
1
1− η
∫ T
0
C1−ηt e
−δtdt ≡
∫ T
0
W˜tdt . (19)
Thus W˜t is (uncertain) discounted utility at time t > 0.
Once again we consider a policy that increases α incrementally. As before, it is easily
seen that the (uncertain) return from this policy is
r˜α =
∫ T
0
1
2
t2C1−ηt e
−δtdt =
∫ T
0
1
2
(1− η)t2W˜tdt . (20)
We can now examine returns over the full time horizon.
We want the expectation, standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio for the cumulative return
over the horizon 0 to T , r˜α. The expectation is straightforward; it is simply
r¯α =
∫ T
0
1
2
t2E0(C1−ηt )e−δtdt =
∫ T
0
1
2
t2e−ρ0t−
1
2
α(1−η)t2+ 1
6
σ2(1−η)2t3dt . (21)
Note that ∂r¯α/∂η can be positive or negative depending on the relative magnitudes of g0, α
and σ, and can change with the time horizon T .
The variance of the return is V(r˜α) = E0(r˜2α)− r¯2α, so we need to find
E0(r2α) = E0
(∫ T
0
1
2
t2C1−ηt e
−δtdt
)2
(22)
We can write the integral as:
r2α ≈

 N∑
j=0
1
2
j2C1−ηj e
−jδ


2
≈
N∑
i=0
N∑
j=0
1
4
i2j2C1−ηi C
1−η
j e
−δ(i+j) (23)
where N = T/∆t.
As shown in the Appendix,
E0(C1−ηi C1−ηj ) = C2(1−η)0 e(1−η)g0(i+j)+b(i,j) , (24)
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where
b(i, j) = 1
12
σ2(1− η)2(i+ j)3 − 1
2
α(1− η)(i2 + j2) . (25)
Setting C0 = 1 and letting ∆t→ 0,
E0(r2α) =
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
1
4
t2s2e−ρ0(t+s)−
1
2
α(1−η)(t2+s2)+ 1
12
σ2(1−η)2(t+s)3dtds . (26)
Using eqns. (21) and (26), we can find the expectation, standard deviation, and Sharpe
ratio for the cumulative return r˜α. Figure 3 shows the Sharpe ratio as a function of η for
two values of σ, a “base case” value of .00012, and .00024, with a time horizon T = 300
years. (The values of α and σ are from a calibration to climate change information discussed
later.) Figure 4 shows E(r) and SD(r) as functions of η for σ = .00012. The expected return
is decreasing in η; a higher value of η increases the effective discount rate on consumption.
The standard deviation, however, is first increasing and then decreasing in η.
Calculating a Sharpe ratio in this way makes it possible to characterize and compare
different policies for different assumptions about parameters such as η and the time horizon
T . Two alternative policies might have the same expected return, but the returns might
differ considerably in their riskiness.
4 WTP and Policy Targets.
In the previous section I considered marginal policies, i.e., policies that would result in a
marginal reduction in α. This allowed for a simple characterization of such policies in terms
of a Sharpe ratio. I turn now to policies that would result in a substantial change in the
drift α and/or the volatility σ, and evaluate those policies in the context of willingness to
pay. I begin with policies for which changes are made at one or more discrete points in time.
This is simpler than the continuous-time case, which I turn to next.
4.1 WTP: Consumption Now and at Future T .
Again, C0 = 1, and CT is uncertain. Under BAU (no abatement policy), α = α0 and σ = σ0.
We want to find the fraction of current and future consumption society would give up to
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decrease α and/or decrease σ. Define a(α1, σ1, T ) = −(1/2)α1(1− η)T 2+(1/6)σ21(1− η)2T 3.
Then to obtain the WTP to move from (α0, σ0) to (α1, σ1), write the social welfare for this
change as:
W1T =
[1− w(α1, σ1, T )]1−η
1− η [1 + e
−ρ0T+a(α1,σ1,T )] . (27)
Under BAU, welfare is
W2T =
1
1− η [1 + e
−ρ0T+a(α0,σ0,T )] (28)
Equating W1T and W2T yields the WTP for this change:
8
w∗(α1, σ1, T ) = 1−
[
1 + e−ρ0T+a(α0,σ0,T )
1 + e−ρ0T+a(α1,σ1,T )
] 1
1−η
, (29)
where ρ0 ≡ δ + (η − 1)g0 as before.
We would like to generate iso-WTP curves, i.e., different combinations of (α′, σ′) such
that w∗(α′, σ′, T ) = w∗(α1, σ1, T ). This would describe a “risk-return” trade-off, i.e., a trade-
off between decreasing α and decreasing σ that yields the same WTP as for moving from
(α0, σ0) to (α1, σ1). For this simple two-period case, this is easily done analytically. Let a(T )
denote the function a with α and σ set to their starting (calibrated for BAU) values of α0
and σ0. Then using eqn. (29), w
∗(α′, σ′, T ) = w∗(α1, σ1, T ) implies:
a(α′, σ′, T ) = a(α1, σ1, T ) , (30)
which in turn implies that
σ′ =
√√√√σ21 + 3(α′ − α1)(1− η)T , (31)
or equivalently,
α′ = α1 +
1
3
(1− η)T (σ′2− σ21) . (32)
Thus moving from (α0, σ0) to any combination (α
′, σ′) that satifies eqn. (32) will have the
same WTP = w∗(α1, σ1, T ).
8Of course it may or may not be possible to shift from (α0, σ0 to α1, σ1). This WTP is simply the most
society would sacrifice for this change in α and σ, were it feasible to do so with the resulting revenue.
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The slope of the iso-WTP curve is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the
two policy targets, α′ and σ′. From (32), the MRS is:
MRS =
dα′
dσ′
=
2
3
σ′(1− η)T . (33)
Note that as T increases, the MRS becomes larger in magnitude, i.e., it takes larger and
larger increases in α′ to compensate for any given reduction in σ′. (This is because of the
σ2T 3 term versus αT 2 in the function a.)
It is important to keep in mind that the (α′, σ′) combinations on the iso-WTP curve
represent different ending positions that result from a policy. In other words, we are always
starting from (α0, σ0). All policies that move from this starting position to an ending position
on the curve have the same WTP.
4.2 Multiple Time Periods; Action at t = 0.
Suppose there are n 50-year time intervals: T1 = 50, T2 = 100, ..., Tn = 50n, and suppose
we can decrease α and/or reduce σ starting immediately by reducing consumption now (i.e.,
at t = 0) and at every future Ti by some fraction. In this case, to find the WTP to move
from (α0, σ0) to (α1, σ1), write the welfare measures W1 and W2 as:
W1 =
[1− w(α1, σ1)]1−η
1− η [1 +
n∑
i=1
e−ρ0Ti+a(α1,σ1,Ti)] (34)
W2 =
1
1− η [1 +
n∑
i=1
e−ρ0Ti+a(α0,σ0,,Ti)] (35)
Thus to obtain w∗(α1, σ1), just replace eqn. (29) with:
w∗(α1, σ1) = 1−
[
1 +
∑n
i=1 e
−ρ0Ti+a(α0,σ0,,Ti)
1 +
∑n
i=1 e
−ρ0Ti+a(α1,σ1,Ti)
] 1
1−η
. (36)
As before, we can generate “iso-WTP” curves, i.e., different combinations of (α′, σ′) such
that w∗(α′, σ′) = w∗(α1, σ1). These “iso-WTP” curves will depend on n because as we saw
above, the dσ2/dα that keepsWT fixed varies with T . Also, we cannot generate these curves
analytically. From eqn. (36), the (α′, σ′) that gives the same WTP as (α1, σ1) is the solution
of:
n∑
i=1
e−ρ0Ti+a(α
′,σ′,Ti) =
n∑
i=1
e−ρ0Ti+a(α1,σ1,Ti) (37)
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Eqn. (37) can be solved numerically for combinations of α′ and σ′.
Eqn. (37) applies to a specific WTP, namely the WTP that applies to moving from
(α0, σ0) to (α1, σ1). Starting from (α0, σ0), however, we can find combinations of α
′ and
σ′ that yield the same arbitrary WTP. Denoting the arbitrary WTP by w∗, we find the
combinations of α′ and σ′ by solving:
n∑
i=1
e−ρ0Ti+a(α
′,σ′,Ti) = (1− w∗)η−1
[
1 +
n∑
i=1
e−ρ0Ti+a(α0,σ0,,Ti)
]
− 1 . (38)
4.3 WTP: Continuous Time with Immediate Action.
Welfare over some future time horizon, with no policy intervention, is given by
W2 =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
e−ρ0t+a(α0,σ0,t)dt . (39)
Now once again consider a policy that would move from (α0, σ0) to (α1, σ1). Denote the
WTP for this policy by w1, and note that with the intervention, welfare is:
W1 =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
(1− w1)1−ηe−ρ0t+a(α1,σ1,t)dt , (40)
where once again, a(α1, σ1, t) = −(1/2)α1(1 − η)t2 + (1/6)σ21(1 − η)2t3. Equating W1 and
W2, we get:
w1 = 1−
[
G(α1, σ1)
G(α0, σ0)
] 1
η−1
, (41)
where
G(α0, σ0) =
∫
∞
0
e−ρ0t+a(α0,σ0,t)dt , (42)
and likewise for G(α1, σ1). Thus, given starting values of α and σ (based, say, on a calibration
of a future T against the IPCC or other distributions), we can calculate the WTP to increase
α and/or decrease σ.
As before, we would like to obtain iso-WTP curves, i.e., combinations of α′ and σ′ for
which the WTP is again w1. This can be done numerically by finding combinations of α
′
and σ′ that satisfy
G(α′, σ′) = G(α1, σ1) . (43)
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We can also obtain combinations of α′ and σ′ for which the WTP is equal to some arbitrary
number, w. From eqn. (41), we find those combinations that satisfy
G(α′, σ′) = (1− w)η−1G(α0, σ0) . (44)
Finally, note that the integration over time cannot be carried out over an arbitrarily large
horizon. It is necessary to limit the time horizon to some number of years, e.g., 200 or 300.
4.4 Costs of Changing α and σ.
We have seen how we can determine the WTP for moving from a starting drift and volatility,
(α0, σ0), to a new (α
′, σ′), and how we can trace out combinations of α and σ targets that
have the same WTP. However, we also want to know the cost of moving from (α0, σ0) to
(α′, σ′). If that cost exceeds the WTP (which is society’s reservation price), the policy is
economically infeasible. If the cost is less than the WTP, the policy yields a positive surplus.
If we knew the costs of changing α and σ we could plot an iso-cost line. If those costs
were linear in the change in α and the change in σ, the iso-cost line would be a straight line,
as drawn in Figure 1, and its tangency with an iso-WTP curve would be the cost-minimizing
target combination of α and σ. There are other target combinations of α and σ with the
same WTP, but they would be more costly to achieve. The minimum cost, however, might
be greater or less than the particular WTP. Given a starting point (α0, σ0), the WTP to
move to a target (α′, σ′) depends on the distance to the target and also on the parameters
η, δ, and g0. For any given shift in α and σ, for example, a reduction in η will increase the
WTP, which implies that for any fixed WTP, the required change in α and σ will be smaller,
so that the corresponding cost will be smaller.
5 Calibration to Climate Change.
Although it is exceedingly simple, the model specified in Section 2 can be informative about
risk and return in the context of climate change policy. In this section, I calibrate the model
by determining values of the parameters αX , σX , and γ that are consistent with recent
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studies of global warming and its impact, along with estimates of the cost of reducing αX
and σX. I then calculate iso-WTP curves and discuss their implications.
5.1 Parameter Values.
To obtain numerical results we need values for α and σ in eqn. (2), the parameters η, δ, and
the initial growth rate g0, and estimates of the costs of reducing α and σ.
Calibration of α and σ under BAU. The most recent IPCC report (2007) states that
growing GHG emissions (i.e., under BAU) would likely lead to a doubling of the atmospheric
CO2e concentration relative to the pre-industrial level by mid-century, which would “most
likely” cause an increase in global mean temperature between 2.0◦C to 4.5◦C by 2100, with
an expected value of 2.5◦C to 3.0◦C. The IPCC report indicates that this range, derived
from the results of 22 scientific studies the IPCC surveyed, represents a roughly 66- to
90-percent confidence interval, i.e., there is a 5 to 17-percent probability of a temperature
increase above 4.5◦C. The 22 studies surveyed by the IPCC also provide rough estimates of
the outer tail of the temperature distribution. In summarizing them, the IPCC translated
the implied outcome distributions into a standardized form that allows comparability across
the studies, and created graphs showing multiple distributions implied by groups of studies.
Those distributions suggest that there is a 5% probability that a doubling of the CO2e
concentration relative to the pre-industrial level would lead to a global mean temperature
increase, T , of 7◦C or more.
I will use, for a horizon of 100 years, E(X) = 3◦C and a 5% probability of a temperature
increase ≥ 7◦C. The 5% point is 1.65 standard deviations above the mean (because eqn. (1)
implies that Tt is normally distributed), so one standard deviation is 4/1.65 = 2.42. Thus
the drift and volatility of the process for temperature are αX = 3/100 = .03, and σX =
2.42/
√
100 = 0.242. More recent studies, e.g., Sokolov et al. (2009), have larger numbers for
the expected temperature change and for the 5% point, but I will use these earlier (perhaps
overly optimistic) estimates.
We need the process for the growth rate gt, and thus we need an estimate of γ, which
relates gt toXt. One way to estimate γ is to use the equation for expected future consumption
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derived in the Appendix, combined with estimates of the expected loss of GDP at a specific
temperature change. The Appendix shows that expected future consumption is given by:
E0(Ct) = eg0t−(1/2)αt2+(1/6)σ2t3 . (45)
In earlier work (2011a, 2012), I used the IPCC (2007) estimates that the loss of GDP resulting
from a temperature change of 4◦C is “most likely” in the range of 1% to 5%. These IPCC
estimates are based on several integrated assessment models (IAMs). Taking the upper end
of the range, i.e., 5%, implies that with α′X = .04, i.e., E0(X100|α′X = .04) = 4◦C, and using
eqn. (45), for t = 100,
E0(Ct) = eg0t−(1/2)α′Xγt2+(1/6)σ2Xγ2t3 = .95eg0t ,
so that
−1
2
α′Xγt
2 + 1
6
σ2Xγ
2t3 = ln(.95) . (46)
Substituting t = 100, α′X = .04 and σX = .242 yields the following quadratic equation for γ:
γ2 − .0205γ + .00000526 = 0
If σX = 0, γ = .000152, so we want the smaller root of this equation, which yields γ = .00026.
This, of course, is an indirect estimate of γ, and relies on the integrated assessment mod-
els surveyed by the IPCC that largely posit, rather than estimate, a relationship between
temperature and GDP. An alternative way to obtain γ is to utilize direct econometric es-
timates. Unfortunately, few such estimates are available; the only ones I am aware of are
those of Dell, Jones, and Olken (2009, 2012) and Bansal and Ochoa (2011a, b). The latter
set of estimates are based on a more extensive data set (147 countries over 1950–2007) and
allow for dynamic adjustment of GDP to changes in temperature. Bansal and Ochoa find
that a 0.2◦C increase in temperature leads to about a .2 percentage point reduction in the
growth of real GDP (a number close to that in Dell, Jones and Olken (2009)). However,
the Bansal-Ochoa impact number is largely transitory; GDP growth largely recovers after
10 years. In my model, the impact of temperature on GDP growth is permanent, so the
Bansal-Ochoa number would imply a value of γ in eqn. (2) of around .001. This is four times
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as large as the value obtained from the IPCC’s survey of IAMs, so I will take as “consensus”
number a value in the middle, namely γ = .0005.
Thus we have αX = .03, σX = .242, and γ = .0005, so that α = αXγ = .000015 and
σ = σXγ = .00012. These are the values for α and σ that correspond to the starting values
(α0, σ0) when calculating WTP and iso-WTP curves.
Other Parameter Values. WTP also depends on the index of relative risk aversion η,
the rate of time preference δ, and the base level growth rate g0. The finance and macroeco-
nomics literatures have estimates of η ranging from 1.5 to 6, and estimates of δ ranging from
.01 to .04. The per capita real growth rate g0, measured from historical data, is about .02. It
has been argued that for intergenerational comparisons δ should be zero, on the grounds that
we should not value the well-being of our great-grandchildren less than our own. Without
taking sides in that argument, I set δ = 0 for the calculations that follow. (For values of δ
of .01 or higher, WTP is close to zero, and it is difficult to justify any policy.)
Likewise, while values of η above 4 may be consistent with the (relatively short-horizon)
behavior of investors and consumers, we might apply lower values to welfare comparisons
involving future generations. In the (deterministic) Ramsey growth model, the optimal
savings rate is s∗ = (R − δ)/ηR, where R is the consumption discount rate and the real
return on investment. If R = .04 and δ = .02, s∗ = 1/2η, suggesting η should be in the range
of 2 to 4. Stern (2007) used a value of 1 for η, which is below the consensus range. Lower
values of η result in higher values of WTP; I will generally set η = 2, but I will also show
how various results depend on η.
Costs of Reducing α and σ. Estimating a cost function is speculative at best, given
the paucity of available data. Nonetheless, I will proceed on the grounds that some estimate
is better than none, and at the very least is illustrative. I will use a linear cost function, i.e.,
the cost of moving from (α0, σ0) to (α
′, σ′) is given by:
Cost = c1(α0 − α′) + c2(σ0 − σ′) (47)
Note that the total cost and its two components are expressed in terms of percentages
of consumption that must be sacrificed annually. Thus c1(α0 − α′) is the percentage of
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consumption that must be given up each year in order to reduce α from α0 to α
′ < α0.
There are no direct estimates of c1 or c2 that I am aware of, so coming up with num-
bers requires extrapolation of the few cost studies that exist, along with some guesswork.
I start with the Kyoto Protocol, which if enacted and adhered to is expected to limit any
increase in global mean temperature by the end of the century to roughly 3◦C (which is the
expected temperature increase under BAU). The U.S. Energy Information Administration
(1998) estimated that compliance with the Protocol would cost from 1 to 3% of GDP an-
nually. Estimates from country cost studies in IPCC (2007c) also put the cost of limiting
the increase in temperature to 3◦C at around 1 to 3% of GDP. I will take the mid-range of
2% of GDP and translate “limiting the increase in temperature to 3◦C” to mean reducing
the expected temperature increase from 3◦C to 1.5◦C with a standard error of about 1.5◦C.
This means cutting the drift α in half, i.e., from .000015 to .0000075, which in turn implies
that c1 = (.02)/(7.5× 10−6) = 2667.
Obtaining an estimate for c2, the cost of reducing the volatility and hence the stan-
dard deviation of future temperature change, is even more difficult. According to numbers
compiled by Palmer (2011), public funding for climate change research in the U.S. during
2009 was about $5 billion. These expenditures could arguably improve our understanding
of global warming and reduce our uncertainty over future temperatures; they exclude public
R&D spending on renewable energy, new technologies, electricity and fossil fuel production,
and related technologies.9 Also, this ignores R&D spending directed at adaptation to cli-
mate change (which so far has been very limited). I will make the bold assumption that a
doubling of the $5 billion in expenditures to $10 billion per year could result in a halving of
the volatility σ0. In other words, reducing σ from .00012 to .00006 would require a sacrifice
of about 0.067% of GDP annually (based on a $15 trillion GDP), which in turn implies that
c2 = .00067/.00006 = 11.17. This number should be viewed as a “‘guesstimate,” but it is
illustrative, and I will also examine the implications of alternative values for c2.
9For the six focus areas of The US Global Change Research Program, this figure includes only “Improving
Knowledge,” “Improving Understanding,” and “Modelling and Prediction.” It also includes about $1 billion
of science expenditures under the 2009 Recovery Act that are climate related. The U.S. GAO (2003) puts
the 2003 expenditure at about $4 billion.
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5.2 Numerical Results.
I begin by calculating iso-WTP curves using the parameter values discussed above. Figure 5
shows three iso-WTP curves, generated using the starting values α0 = .000015 and σ0 =
.00012 based on the calibration described above. Other parameters are g0 = .02, δ = 0, η = 2,
and the time horizon is T = 300 years. The starting values (α0, σ0) are shown as the small
circle near the bottom of the diagram. The solid line in the middle is the iso-WTP curve
for WTP = .0365, which is the WTP to reduce α to zero but leave σ unchanged. Thus
moving from (α0, σ0) to any point on that curve has a WTP of .0365. The other two curves
in Figure 5 show combinations of α and σ that, starting from α0 and σ0, have WTPs of .02
and .06. (Note that all of the values of α on the top curve are negative.)
Figure 6 shows an iso-WTP curve (labeled B) for the same starting and ending values of
the drift and volatility, (α0, σ0) = (.000015, .00012) and (α
′, σ′) = (0, .00012), and the same
values for the other parameters, so that the WTP is again .0365. The curve labeled A shows
alternative combinations of starting values for α0 and σ0 that give the same WTP = .0365
for any target on curve B. Thus shifts from any points on curve A to any points on curve B
have a WTP of .0365 and thus are welfare-equivalent.
The iso-WTP curves in Figure 5 show the most that society would be willing to pay
(in terms of percentage of consumption sacrificed) in order to move from a starting point
(α0, σ0) to an ending point on the curve. They do not, however, tell us anything about the
cost of moving from (α0, σ0) to an ending point. If the cost exceeds the WTP, the policy
is economically infeasible; if the cost is less than the WTP, the policy has a positive social
surplus. In addition, since all points on an iso-WTP curve are welfare-equivalent, we might
like to know which point has the least cost. To address these questions I utilize the iso-cost
lines implied by eqn. (47), with the calibrated values for c1 and c2, i.e., the cost equation
Cost = 2667(α0 − α′) + 11.17(σ0 − σ′) . (48)
Figure 7 shows an iso-WTP curve that plots combinations of target values of α and σ
that have a WTP of .02, given the starting point (α0, σ0) = (.000015, .00012), which is shown
as a small circle near the bottom of the figure. Also shown is an iso-cost line that is tangent
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to the iso-WTP curve, i.e., at the point where the slope of the iso-WTP curve is −c2/c1.
(Remember that α is decreasing as we move up the vertical axis.) Thus at this point the cost
of moving from (α0, σ0) to the iso-WTP curve is minimized. In this example, that cost turns
out to be about .020, i.e., the same as the WTP. Thus the policy illustrated by Figure 7 is
just feasible, i.e., society would be paying its reservation price for the policy, so the social
surplus would be zero. On the other hand, if we were to double both c1 and c2 (so that the
slope and tangency point remained the same), the cost would also double, making the policy
economically infeasible. And if we were to instead halve both c1 and c2, the cost would drop
to .010, so that the policy would have a positive social surplus of .01, i.e., 1% of GDP.
Given eqn. (48), the cost of any policy is a simple function of the changes in α and σ.
But the WTP for changes in α and σ depends not only on the magnitudes of the changes,
but also on the parameters η, δ, and g0. For any given shift in α and σ, for example, a
reduction in η will increase the WTP.10 Equivalently, a lower value of η implies that for any
fixed WTP, the required changes in α and σ will be smaller. This is illustrated by Figure 8,
which is the same as Figure 7 except that η = 1.5 instead of 2. If η = 1.5 it takes much
smaller reductions in α and σ to have a WTP of .02, and thus the cost of the policy is much
smaller (.008 versus .020). In this case the policy has a positive social surplus.
Table 1 shows the target (α′, σ′), the cost, and the net social surplus for other parameter
values. The first row shows the base case corresponding to Figure 7, and the second row
corresponds to Figure 8 (in which η is reduced to 1.5 but the WTP is fixed at .02, so that the
cost falls and the social surplus is positive). Increasing η to 3 implies that for any fixed target
(α′, σ′), the WTP will fall, so that obtaining a WTP of .02 requires a much larger shift in
(α′, σ′), and thus a much higher cost (in this case .091 so that the social surplus is negative).
As the fourth row shows, with η = 3 we can still obtain a positive social surplus, but only
when the WTP is very small. As the fifth row of the table shows, reducing g0 has the same
effect as reducing η (the initial deterministic consumption discount rate is R0 = δ+ ηg0), so
10Reducing η reduces the effective consumption discount rate, which, ignoring uncertainty, is given by
Rt = δ+ηgt (the deterministic Ramsey rule). Thus reducing η increases the present value of future losses of
consumption resulting from higher temperatures. For further discussion of this point, see Pindyck (2012).
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Table 1: WTP and Cost
Note: Entries show changes from the base case, for which c1 = 2667, c2 = 11.17, η = 2,
g0 = .02, and δ = 0. Throughout, starting point is α0 = .000015 and σ0 = .00012.
Change from Social
Base Case WTP α′ σ′ Cost Surplus
BASE CASE .02 .0000077 .000046 .020 0
η = 1.5 .02 .000012 .000068 .008 .012
η = 3 .02 −.0000187 .000046 .091 −.071
η = 3 .00032 .0000152 .000041 .00032 0
g0 = .01 .02 .0000131 .000033 .0060 .014
δ = .01 .02 −.0000031 .000067 .049 −.029
c2 = 22.34 .02 .0000074 .000090 .021 −.001
that the target (α′, σ′) is closer to the initial (α0, σ0) and the cost falls. Increasing δ has the
same directional effect as increasing η, so that with WTP fixed at .02, the cost increases.
Finally, in the last row of the table, c2, the cost of reducing σ, is doubled. As we would
expect, this increases the overall cost (but not by much), and causes the target (α′, σ′) to
shift to a larger reduction in α and smaller reduction in σ.
5.3 Policy Design and Evaluation.
Taking this simple model and the calibrated parameter values at face value, we can infer the
optimal mix of risk and return as targets of climate change policy. We can likewise determine
whether a particular pair of policy targets (which might or might not be an optimal mix)
yields a positive social surplus, i.e., has a cost less than the WTP for the targets. Finally,
we can determine alternative target combinations that are welfare-equivalent, in that they
lie on the same iso-WTP curve.
In Figure 7, for example, the iso-WTP curve corresponds to a WTP of .02, and given the
starting point (i.e., α0 and σ0 under BAU), the optimal target mix calls for cutting both α
and σ roughly in half. The cost of reaching this optimal target mix turns out to be .02 as
well, so that the policy is just feasible. We could have instead chosen an alternative target
mix that also has a WTP of .02 (i.e., a different point on the iso-WTP curve), but the cost
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of that policy would exceed .02.
As is evident from Figure 8 and Table 1 the social surplus for any particular policy
depends not only on the iso-WTP curve and the cost parameters c1 and c2, but also on the
parameters δ, η, and g0. The dependence on δ and η in particular has been a long-standing
problem for the design and evaluation of climate policy. What are the “correct” values
for these parameters that should be used for policy evaluation? Economists disagree. The
answer depends in part on whether we view these as behavioral parameters (i.e., reflecting
the behavior of consumers, investors, and firms) or policy parameters (i.e., reflecting the
opinions and objectives of policy makers). Either way, we are left with a wide range of
reasonable values, and thus a wide range of estimates of WTP for any target mix. As a
comparison of Figures 8 and 8 show, a value of η of 1.5 versus 2.0 yields very different WTPs
for any given set of targets (or, as in the figures, very different targets for a fixed WTP). The
approach to policy design outlined in this paper does not get around this problem. Thus
it is probably best used as a way of clarifying policy target tradeoffs (risk versus return)
conditional on some set of values for η, etc.
6 Concluding Remarks.
Using a simple model of a stock externality (e.g., temperature) that evolves stochastically, I
examined the extent to which the value of a costly policy (e.g., emissions abatement) depends
on the policy’s expected future benefits versus their riskiness. I also presented a framework
by which one can estimate the extent to which the objective of policy should be a reduction
in the expected future damages versus a reduction in the uncertainty over those damages.
The framework is based on the computation of “iso-WTP curves” (social indifference curves)
for combinations of risk and expected returns as policy objectives. Given cost estimates for
reducing risk and increasing expected returns, one can then compute the optimal risk-return
mix for policy, and evaluate the policy’s social surplus.
To illustrate this framework, I used a simple Brownian motion process for the stock
variable, in this case temperature, and a CRRA utility function. This has the advantage
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of yielding simple expressions for expected future consumption and utility. However, the
framework can be applied to alternative stochastic processes for the stock variable and
alternative social preferences, although numerical methods may be needed to obtain results.
In the case of climate change, there is a broad consensus on the expected rate of tem-
perature increase under BAU — about 3◦C. There is considerable disagreement, however,
over the nature and extent of uncertainty around that expected value. That disagreement
relates to the choice of probability distribution that best applies to future temperatures
(e.g., whether the distribution should be fat- or thin-tailed), and to the parameterization
of any particular distribution.11 I have used a simple (thin-tailed) normal distribution to
describe temperature change, but one can incorporate alternative distributions (using al-
ternative stochastic processes for Xt). Thus the framework presented here can be used to
evaluate the implications of alternative characterizations of uncertainty for determining the
targets of climate change policy.
It is an understatement to say that caveats are needed. First, costs of reducing α and σ are
probably convex, not linear as in eqn. (47). But a linear cost function may be a reasonable
first approximation, and in any case our ability to estimate these costs is limited. More
troublesome is the assumption that whatever the cost, we can change α and σ instantly.
One would expect that shifts in α and σ would occur gradually in response to ongoing
expenditures on abatement and R&D. Also, I calculated WTP under the restriction that the
flows of costs are constant percentages of GDP. In fact, those costs might fall as a result of
technological change making it cheaper to limit GHG emissions. And even if the costs do
not fall, WTP might be calculated under the alternative assumption that costs increase or
decrease over time as the policy becomes more or less stringent. The model can be modified
to allow for gradual changes in α and σ and/or costs that are time-varying (although both
changes would be at the cost of complicating the numerical solution of the model).
Even maintaining the simple assumptions used here (in which the change in α and σ
occur instantly and the flow cost is a constant percentage of GDP), the framework can be
11Pindyck (2011b) addresses the question of fat- versus thin-tailed distributions in the context of climate
change policy.
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extended in a number of directions. For example, the timing of policy implementation can
be made endogenous. Suppose a policy is imposed only when temperature reaches a critical
threshold (e.g., 3◦C). Given a cost for the policy, we could then determine the temperature
threshold that maximizes net welfare.
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Appendix: Some Expectations
There are some key expected values that are used throughout this paper. They are
derived below, beginning with Es(C1−ηt ).
Expected Utility. Denote F (C, g, s) = Es(C1−ηt ), for t > s. Then F must satisfy the
following partial differential equation (i.e., Kolmogorov Forward Equation):
dF = 1
2
σ2Fgg − αFg + gCFC + Fs = 0 , (49)
with boundary conditions F (C, g, t) = C1−ηt and F (0, g, s) = 0. Try, and then verify by
substitution, a function of the form:
F (C, g, s) = C1−ηs e
(1−η)gs(t−s)+a(s) . (50)
The partial derivatives are:
Fg = (1− η)(t− s)F
Fgg = (1− η)2(t− s)2F
FC = (1− η)F/C
Fs = [−(1− η)gs + a′(s)]F
After substituting into eqn. (49) and dividing through by F , we have:
a′(s) = −1
2
σ2(1− η)2(t− s)2 + α(1− η)(t− s) (51)
so that the function a(s) is:
a(s) = 1
6
σ2(1− η)2(t− s)3 − 1
2
α(1− η)(t− s)2 . (52)
Note that if η > 1 and α > 0, a(s) > 0.
Thus starting at time s = 0 with C0 = 1,
E0(C1−ηt )e−δt = e−δt+(1−η)g0t−(1/2)α(1−η)t
2+(1/6)σ2(1−η)2t3 . (53)
Note that if η > 1, as t increases, E0(C1−ηt ) first decreases and then eventually increases
without bound. Thus the integration over time to compute welfare must be done for a finite
horizon.
Expected Consumption. We will also need an expression for E0(Ct). Following the
same steps as above it is easy to show that if C0 = 1,
E0(Ct) = eg0t−(1/2)αt2+(1/6)σ2t3 . (54)
Note that if α2 > 2g0σ
2, E0(Ct) is first increasing in t up to a local maximum, then will
decrease to a local minimum, and then increase without bound. But if α2 < 2g0σ
2, then
E0(Ct) will always be increasing in t.
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Expectations of Products. We will want to calculate the variance of the return from
an abatement policy. To do this we need the expectation of C1−ηi C
1−η
j for two different future
times i and j. Denote G(C, g, s) = Es(C1−ηi C1−ηj ) for i, j > s. Then G satisfies the following
Kolmogorov Forward Equation:
dG = 1
2
σ2Ggg + αGg + gCGC +Gs = 0 , (55)
Try and confirm that the solution has the form:
G(C, g, s) = C2(1−η)s e
(1−η)gs[(i−s)+(j−s)]+b(s) . (56)
Substituting the partial derivatives Gg , Ggg, etc. into eqn. (55) yields
b′(s) = −1
2
σ2(1− η)2[(i− s) + (j − s)]2 + α(1− η)[(i− s) + (j − s)] (57)
so that the function b(s) is:
b(s) = 1
12
σ2(1− η)2[(i− s) + (j − s)]3 − 1
2
α(1− η)[(i− s)2 + (j − s)2] . (58)
I use this result when calculating the variance of incremental returns from an abatement
policy.
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Figure 1: Iso-WTP Curves and Iso-Cost Line
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Figure 2: Iso-WTP Starting Curve and Target Curve
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Figure 3: Sharpe Ratio vs. η (g0 = .020, δ = 0, T = 300, σ = .00012 and .00024)
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Figure 4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Return vs. η (g0 = .020, δ = 0, T = 300, σ =
.00012)
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Figure 5: Iso-WTP Curves (g0 = .020, δ = 0, η = 2, T = 300)
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Figure 6: Iso-WTP Starting and Target Curves (g0 = .020, δ = 0, η = 2, T = 300)
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Figure 7: Iso-WTP and Iso-Cost Curves (g0 = .020, δ = 0, η = 2, T = 300)
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